

2019 security radar.



Wake-up call for Europe!



**FRIEDRICH
EBERT** 
STIFTUNG

**FES Regionalbüro für
Zusammenarbeit und
Frieden in Europa**

FES Regional Office for
Cooperation and Peace
in Europe

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Forewords

By Kurt Beck

*Chairman of the
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Former Minister President
of Rhineland-Palatinate*

European security now finds itself in choppy waters. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) commitment to 'a new Europe' in 1990, which was once so optimistic and oriented toward the future, has slipped farther out of reach. Instead of a truly united Europe, we see deep divisions emerging that were unimaginable a quarter of a century ago.

The victims are all of Europe's citizens, especially those who suffer from armed conflicts. For Germany in particular, the primary foreign policy goal was and still is working to achieve long-term and sustainable peace in Europe.

Consequently, it is all the more important that we understand the needs and fears present in Europe. We need new analyses to meet the foreign policy challenges of the 21st century. There is no blueprint we can follow. German Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt once said that new challenges require answers that are in keeping with the times. This is precisely the urgent situation we are facing today, which requires that we undertake extraordinary efforts to find solutions.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany's oldest policy Foundation, founded in 1925, has already had to overcome difficult periods. But it has always been guided by its goal of shouldering responsibility for working toward peace and social progress in Europe and the world.

I therefore welcome the fact that the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has taken the initiative in creating the Security Radar, a mechanism for carrying out public opinion surveys and one which channels the findings into the political debate.

These surveys are being conducted not only in Germany itself, but also in six other selected European countries, that include both members of the European Union and non-EU countries. Despite the high level of harmonisation in Europe, national sensitivities remain diverse, and understanding this is precisely what must form the basis of a responsible foreign and security policy.

The European Security Radar Project undertaken by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung can offer a pan-European overview of threat perceptions, which is fully in the interest of our Social-Democratic foundation.

I sincerely hope that the Security Radar receives the necessary attention it deserves to be truly heard by both political leaders and society.

By Dr. Heinz Fischer

*Federal President of the
Republic of Austria
2004 - 2016*

Europe has entered a phase where it is being put to the test and must once again navigate the way ahead. Values such as community and solidarity are increasingly being challenged in domestic politics. Many are seeking a European identity in times of seemingly overwhelming globalisation, yet personal feelings of security remain paramount.

Threats are on the rise - either in actuality, or are increasingly being perceived as such and include climate change, terrorism and waves of refugees. Europeans' perception of security is changing; what was considered secure and stable yesterday is now seen as a threat.

That is why it is long overdue for us to ask the citizens of European countries how they view the issue of security. This applies not only to the countries individually, but also to the countries of Europe collectively.

It is only when a representative survey such as the Security Radar provides specific insights as to where fears are rooted, that political leaders in Europe can tailor their security measures accordingly. The objective is to perceive, limit and, in the best-case scenario, eliminate these threats.

The goal of European governments must be to take Europeans and their needs adequately into account in their assessment and decision-making processes. The Security Radar survey is an essential tool, an evaluation instrument, for obtaining unfiltered and objective insights into European security perceptions.

The Security Radar published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe will help provide a clear view of Europeans' perceptions and attitudes. It can lay the foundations for European governments to draw constructive conclusions and help the media glean a realistic assessment of European stances in order to counter speculation and even counter propaganda.

I am very pleased that the FES Regional Office in Vienna, established at the beginning of 2017, and an initiative I very much welcomed, has assumed responsibility for carrying out this unique survey in Europe and is implementing the project for the benefit of all of the countries in Europe.

We eagerly look forward to the results. Moreover, we must take them seriously as a basis for reaching political solutions and decisions, thereby enabling Europeans to continue to live in peace and security in their own countries and in the European Union.

Executive Summary

In the context of dramatic challenges to the European security architecture, emerging conflicts, both hot and cold, an annexation and more and more frequent cyber-attacks, the analysis presented in 'Security Radar 2019 - Wake-up call for Europe' is intended to shed light on two major factors of crucial importance for political decision makers: general public opinion and particular expert perspectives on the security and foreign policy situation in Europe.

The aim of the analysis is to provide detailed insights into a topic that is relevant to both politicians and society as a whole. In the 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the seemingly solid and peaceful road towards unity that Europe seemed to have set out on, new gaps have opened up, even within the EU.

Responses to the survey varied across all dimensions, with only a few predictable constants, such as the annexation issue or attitudes towards NATO in Serbia and Russia.

In the expert group discussions one could clearly discern the transformative character of the current security situation in Europe. All seven states surveyed (Germany, France, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine and Russia) are in the midst of this transformation, although we do not yet know where it is going and when it will end. The main reason for this is the reorientation of important players in European security (the EU, the People's Republic of China, Russia and the United States): international relations have become much more volatile, while old alliances and 'special relationships' are being redefined by domestic developments. Nevertheless, this study has also uncovered positive factors that at least offer some hope that people's fears right across Europe and the demands arising from them could influence the political agenda.

Radar's main advantage is its early warning capability. Our analysis in this report has a sound empirical basis and indicates that the security situation is fragile in both the West and the East. A mixture of people's diminishing trust in central state institutions and discomfort with their government's positions on the broadest level have created the widely discussed sense of insecurity in Europe. The consequences of this include a turn towards militaristic politics, the simplistic political sloganeering of populist parties and a general turn towards nationalism. The prevailing 'state of mind' in the seven countries analysed, which represent different regions of a larger Europe and generally give us a broader perspective than the situation within their borders, is thus characterised by worry and criticism of the political status quo. This report is tasked with transforming this early warning into timely political awareness by instigating appropriate political steps. It does indeed offer policy makers a wake-up call.



Introduction

- > Overview
- > Research Design

Overview

In the context of dramatic challenges for the European Security Architecture, new emerging cold and hot conflicts, an annexation, and intensifying cyber-attacks, the Security Radar 2019 – Wake-up-call for Europe analysis aims to shed light on two main factors which have a substantial impact on political decision makers: public opinion in general, and expert perspectives in particular, regarding the security and foreign policy situation in Europe.

The aim of the analysis is to provide in-depth information on a topic that is relevant for both politicians and society as a whole. In the 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the seemingly solid and peaceful road towards European unity, new divisions have opened up within Europe, and even within the European Union.

According to some experts, even though there are far fewer conventional and nuclear weapons on its territory, Europe appears to be in a worse situation today than it was during the Cold War. The experts suggest that the rules and common understanding that once guided the world through dangerous moments are becoming more and more irrelevant. A military conflict cannot be excluded with the certainty that we had a quarter of a century ago.

The representative public opinion poll, held in seven European countries, was developed by the FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe and conducted by Ipsos Berlin. It systematically analyses and investigates the attitudes and values related to the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, five years after the eruption of the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia.

Seven countries were chosen to participate in this public opinion poll. They are France and Germany, two founding members of the organisation now known as the European Union; Latvia and Poland who joined the EU in 2004; Serbia, which has had full candidate status for EU membership since 2013; Ukraine, which signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU in 2016; and lastly, Russia.

The choice of the seven countries detailed above for participation in the poll was based on their importance for European security: France and Germany are, for the moment, the two remaining major countries of the EU, whose support is necessary for any possible initiatives; Poland is the most powerful Central Eastern European EU member state; Latvia is a member of the historically volatile Baltic region and a former Soviet republic; Serbia is a very im-

portant country in Southeast Europe, with ties to the EU but with cultural affinity to Russia; Ukraine is the largest country of the Eastern Partnership programme and is currently trying to defend itself against separatists backed by Russia in Donbass. Last, but not least, the poll includes Russia, because without Russia any talk of security in Europe is pointless.

In addition to the poll, active political consulting experts from the above-mentioned countries were involved in group discussions, intended to determine the typical mindset of the local expert community: to reveal how experts evaluated the current situation and what actions they recommended accordingly. In each country a small group of approximately five experts participated in an active and open discussion. The criteria for including the experts were (a) proven expertise and knowledge, as acknowledged within the country-specific expert discourse and (b) established influence on the political discourse within the country.

Each data set was analysed separately. Subsequently the results were triangulated. The guiding research aim of this analytical step was to identify how the expert mind-set and public opinion differ and to examine what conclusions can be drawn from this. This information can be found in the chapter on country reports.

This final report consists of four chapters. The first chapter includes introductory remarks by Heinz Fischer, former President of the Republic of Austria, and Kurt Beck, former Governor of Rhineland-Palatinate and now Head of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Germany, as well as an introduction to the main findings of the public opinion poll. The second chapter presents the main findings, divided into the status quo, challenges and approaches. The third chapter is devoted to the differences and similarities found between the seven countries. The last chapter seeks to analyse the findings of the survey in light of the focus group discussions and current trends. The chapter concludes with three recommendations.

Research Design

The research is designed to shed light on two main factors that have substantial impact on political decision makers when faced with security or foreign affairs issues: public opinion and the perspective of political consulting experts. Accordingly, the design of the study consists of two main steps of data collection and analysis: a representative public opinion poll and expert group discussions.

A representative public opinion poll was conducted in seven European countries: Germany, France, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine and Russia. The aim was to systematically investigate the attitudes to the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the necessary fieldwork.

Expert-group-discussions in each of the seven countries provided access to (a) expert-knowledge and (2) the typical mind-set of the regional consulting expert community. This step aimed to replicate how regional expert communities define and evaluate the current security and foreign policy situation and investigated what useful lessons could be derived from their perspective.

Survey

A representative opinion survey was conducted with the help of a fully standardised instrument (CATI-Dual-Frame). The target population surveyed consisted of citizens of the seven countries detailed above, aged 18 or over, with access to at least one landline telephone or at least one cell-phone.

The survey explores public opinion concerning the current security and foreign policy situation in five dimensions:

- *Perception of the current threat situation*
- *Trust and attitudes towards institutions*
- *Attitudes towards foreign and security policy*
- *Attitudes towards national identity*
- *Prospects for the development of security policy in Europe.*

Furthermore, descriptors consisting of sociodemographics, political views and information behaviour were collected.

The survey uses Likert-scaled, binary and open-ended questions. The objective of Likert-scaling is to measure the extent of agreement or disagreement with a question or statement. In most cases, the extent is measured on a four-point scale ranging from 'strongly agree', 'somewhat agree', 'somewhat disagree' to 'strongly disagree'. Some five-point and ten-point scales were also used. The respondents could also decline to agree or disagree with the question or statement. In this case, the answer was coded as 'I don't know'.

For statistical analysis, each point scale is converted into a number from one to four (and in a few cases one to five or ten). Statistical analysis was performed using Microsoft® Excel® and IBM® SPSS® Statistics Version 25.

Before the main fieldwork began, a pre-test was conducted in Germany (n=52) and Serbia (n=54) to test the clarity of the questions, answer options, the questionnaire's length, as well as willingness to participate. The pre-test took place between May 29th and 30th 2018. Contacts were recruited under realistic fieldwork conditions. The results of the pre-test were used to inform the final design of the questionnaire.

For each country surveyed a national representative sample of n=1,000 net cases was sought. The following sample was retrieved from the target population:

Country	n
Germany	1,000
France	1,017
Russia	1,000
Poland	1,002
Ukraine	1,000
Latvia	1,000
Serbia	1,001
Total	7,022

The sampling method consisted of a multi-level, layered random selection process based on a sample, together with a random sample of the interviewees (Random Last Two Digits Approach). By applying the Dual-frame method, two separate samples were formed in each of the survey countries.

The data was weighted in a multi-stage process. First, the landline telephone household-sample was transformed into a person-sample. Second, the landline telephone household-sample and the cell-phone individual-sample were transformed into a person-sample. Finally, the unweighted sample-structure was adjusted to the official statistics. For the last step of the weighting process the sex, age and region variables were used to calculate the weighting factors. The iterative 'Rim weight' procedure supplied by Quantum Software® was used.

Expert Group Discussion

With the help of a semi-structured interview instrument, expert group discussions were conducted in each of the above-mentioned countries. Trained moderators carried out the data collection. Target groups were active political consulting experts and analysts. All expert group discussions took place in October and November 2018.

The central theme of the discussion was the current foreign and security situation in Europe. The participants were instructed that the notion of 'Europe' should go beyond the European Union and should be understood as 'Greater Europe'.

The semi-structured interview instrument consisted of three phases:

1. An open discussion about the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe. Guiding questions were:

- *What concrete challenges have shaped the landscape of foreign policies of European countries as well the security situation in Europe in recent years?*
- *Can you broadly describe the current security situation in Europe?*
- *How did the current situation emerge?*

2. A summary of the discussion and identification of key corresponding categories was compiled together with the participants, as well as a focused reflection on how every category was understood. The content was limited to the aspects introduced by the participants. The moderators provided no additional external information or content.

The main goal of the first two phases was to gain access to country specific expert-knowledge.

3. A subsequent guided discussion focused on necessary political steps to improve the status quo. In this phase, the experts were put in the virtual role of policy advisors. To provide comparability, the dimensions of the guided focus were the same as in the survey.

The main goal of this phase was to gain access to the shared underlying perspective, with which the experts participate in the current political discourse.

The criteria for including the experts in the sample were that they had (a) proven expert-knowledge, which is acknowledged within the country specific expert-discourse and (b) influence on the political discourse within the country. Expert group discussions were realised in each country with between five and seven experts involved in each discussion. The duration of the discussion varied between 120 and 140 minutes. 'Chatham House Rules' were applied to protect the participants from possible repercussions.

After each discussion, the moderators compiled a verbatim protocol from memory. Furthermore, the discussion was recorded and transcribed for content and mind-set analyses. Finally, after content and mind-set analyses for each country were completed, the results were triangulated with the results of the public opinion poll.



Descriptive Analysis



- > Diagnosis
- > Challenges
- > Approaches

Diagnosis



First, the Good News. The respondents consistently perceive their own country as part of the European cultural sphere (87%) and therefore state that Europe should grow together more closely (79%).

∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine

My country is part of the European cultural sphere.




Europe has its own culture area and should grow closer together as a community on this basis.



Now to the Challenges. 80% of respondents think that their respective country has a unique culture, which should be increasingly protected. Initially surprising, this finding is explained by differences between Russia, Ukraine and Serbia on the one

side where 89%, 90% and 94% respectively agree or totally agree with these statements, compared with Germany and France, where the proportion of agreement, although still held by the majority, clearly is smaller at 59% and 63% respectively.

I think that my country has a unique culture, which should be protected more than ever before.



This reveals something systematic witnessed throughout our results. The threat perception in Europe – and in Eastern Europe especially – is very high and at the same time, the perceived legitimacy of institutions is alarmingly low. In a climate of fear, old mind-sets about ‘friend and foe’ stemming from the Cold War era are resurrected.

But there is a silver lining - the European population surveyed is, in general, in favour of diplomatic solutions and rejects military intervention. Furthermore, we find among the French and the German population the potential to work as an engine towards developing a foreign policy. This may solve current conflicts such as in Ukraine and overcome the nationalisation of security issues.







The people of all polled European states are greatly concerned about current events and developments in world affairs. Only the growing world population is perceived as not so threatening – this was especially notable in respondents from


Eastern Europe. Surprisingly, disagreement and conflict within the European Union is not the number one concern – even among respondents of its member states.

To what extent are you personally concerned about the following current events that are frequently discussed at the moment? For each event, please state on a four-level-scale how worried or not worried you are.

■ Not worried at all ■ Somewhat less worried ■ Somewhat worried ■ Very worried

∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine







Germany and France showed similar responses overall. Against the background of a strong economy, the German and Polish respondents are least worried about a possible economic crisis.

However, in France, disagreement and conflict within the European Union is of least concern. The most threatening events perceived in all countries are war and conflict, and this response is especially high in conflict-ridden Ukraine.

Fear of war and other conflicts is not merely an abstract threat. The surveyed populations in Eastern Europe in particular fear that war and other conflicts will also affect their country in the future. Not surprisingly this view is especially high in Ukraine. However, this fear is also widespread in Poland.

In France and especially Germany, the surveyed population is less concerned. The conceptualisation of the tensions between Russia and the West as a threat to the security situation in Europe is more prevalent in Eastern European countries. In Russia and Ukraine 59% of the respective population agrees or fully agrees with this statement. Meanwhile, the surveyed populations of Germany and France reject this proposition with 75% and 60% of disapproval ratings respectively.



*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.




Relations between Russia and many European states are described as being influenced by the following factors: sanctions as a result of the Ukrainian conflict (72%); lacking will to cooperate (69%); the USA (68%). A majority of respondents furthermore agreed with other factors included: the eastern expansion of the EU and NATO (60%); incompatible values and mindsets (58%); internal political de-

velopments in Russia (66%); interferences of European states in the internal affairs of Russia (57%) as well as interferences of Russia in the internal affairs of European states (50%) all represented major influences on relations. Even repercussions of the Cold War were perceived by 52% of respondents as a relevant factor influencing relations between Russia and many European states.


**What is currently influencing relations between Russia and many European states?
The relations are influenced by:**

■ Strongly agree ■ Somewhat agree


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
The interference of European states in the internal affairs of Russia




Internal political developments in Russia



USA




Incompatible values and mindsets between Russia and many European states




*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

The repercussions of the Cold War



A lack of cooperation



*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

Responsibility for the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict is attributed to Russia (60%) and the separatist (57%), followed by Ukraine itself (50%), the USA (44%) and finally the EU (33%). The surveyed populations of Germany, Ukraine, France and Serbia see the separatists as being mainly responsible for the conflict. Respondents in Ukraine, Germa-


ny, France, Poland and Latvia see Russia as being mainly responsible for the escalation in the conflict; by contrast, respondents in Russia perceive Ukraine as being mainly responsible. Moreover, respondents in Russia and Serbia perceive the USA and the EU as being mainly responsible for the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict.

We are now interested in your opinion on current security policy challenges. In your opinion, who is responsible for the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict? You can name several.


■ Yes ■ No

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
Separatists




Ukraine




Russia




EU



USA



*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.



*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.



Asked whether Crimea was illegally annexed or legally incorporated into the Russian Federation, a majority among all respondents think that it was an illegal act (56% versus 34%). This statement

is rejected by most of the respondents in Russia (88%). An overwhelming majority in Russia (90%) and a majority in Serbia (54%) think that Crimea was legally incorporated by Russia.

I will read out two statements about Crimea. To what extent do you agree with them?

Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree

Ø = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine



*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

Recognition and perception of the role of international organisations entrusted with security differs widely. NATO is perceived as the most influential organisation in Europe and is known by over 99% of all respondents. In contrast, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is perceived as least influential and is largely unknown, even in Eastern Europe.


Around 30% of the Russian and Ukrainian respondents and around 50% of the German, Polish, Latvian and French respondents were not familiar with the CSTO. Meanwhile, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is not known to 17% of all respondents and takes a mid-position concerning its perceived impact on the world stage.

To what extent do you think these organisations influence international political events?


■ No influence at all, Low influence
 ■ Very strong influence, Strong influence
 ■ Medium influence
■ I don't know this organisation
 ■ No answer

∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine


 **NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)**



 **EU (European Union)**




 **UN (United Nations)**




*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.


OSCE OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe)



EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union)



CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation)



*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

War and conflict are manifest fears in Europe. In Eastern Europe in particular the threat perception is high. Against the background of the Ukrainian conflict, this perception is not based on abstract fear. Worryingly, according to the perspective of their respective surveyed populations, Russia and

Europe seem to be perceived as being in opposition to each other. On the upside, the respondents of France and Germany appear to feel less affected by the current developments. It seems that this fragile situation is leading to a reactivation of old conflict lines of the Cold War, especially in Eastern Europe.




Challenges

The main challenge to a European security strategy manifests itself in the dissatisfaction with the status of countries in the world, especially in Eastern Europe. In Russia this concept polarises: Here 32% of respondents totally agree that the country does not have the status in the world that it deserves and 26% totally disagree. Furthermore, in Russia, Ukraine and Serbia, the respondents consider other countries responsible for preventing their country from achieving true greatness. In Germany and France however, the respondents reject both conceptualisations. On a positive note, all European respondents see the fate of their country's prosperity as being connected with the well-being and positive development of others.

If you think about both your country and other countries, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

■ Strongly agree
 ■ Somewhat agree
 ■ Somewhat disagree
 ■ Strongly disagree

DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine



In addition, especially in Eastern Europe, the conceptions of potential enemies are still constructed along the conflict lines of the Cold War. The two most feared countries are the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In particular 51% of the Polish respondents and 60% of Ukrainians perceive the Russian Federation as a great security threat. On the other hand – consistent with its overall responses – the Serbian respondents are not concerned about Russia. Me-

anwhile, the surveyed populations of Germany and France are more concerned about the US and have less concrete enemy images overall - more than 60% of these respondents did not name any country as being perceived as threatening. Remarkably, with 11%, Turkey seems almost to be as much of a threat in the view of the German respondents as the Russian Federation. For the Russian respondents however, the US is seen by far as the number one threat (46%).

In your opinion, is there a country or are there several countries that constitute a threat to your country? If yes, please name this country or these countries.

Germany



France



Poland



Latvia








Echoing familiar Cold-War categories, overall 43% of respondents ascribe Russia to be a threat to security in Europe, whereas 50% assign this role to the US. The surveyed population of Poland (77%) and Ukraine (67%), mainly perceive Russia to be a

threat, however the USA is perceived as the main threat by respondents from Russia and Serbia (78% and 71% respectively). In Germany and France almost half of respondents consider the USA rather than Russia to be a threat to Europe’s security.

Thinking of security in Europe, what is your opinion on the following statements?

■ Strongly agree
 ■ Somewhat agree
 ■ Somewhat disagree
 ■ Strongly disagree
 Ø = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine






*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

Almost 52% of all respondents think that the movement of NATO towards the Russian border represents a threat to security in Europe. This statement receives the highest approval in Russia (76%) and Serbia (71%). In Germany and Latvia around 50% agree or totally agree with these statements, whereas in France, Poland and Ukraine it is less than half.


To make things even worse, the trust in political institutions and the rule of law within Europe is alarmingly low. Only the military and the police have high values of approval, which can be put into perspective when taking the widespread fears concerning war and conflict into account. Political parties, governments and the media are especially mistrusted - this poses significant challenges for the acceptance and legitimacy of foreign affairs and security policies.

To what extent do you trust the following institutions:


■ Trust completely
 ■ Rather trust
 ■ Rather do not trust
 ■ Do not trust at all
 Ø = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine




Courts




Police






Military



Intelligence services



*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.






*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

The view that foreign policy is an instrument that primarily serves the interests of the respective country is a widely held view in all European states. Furthermore, with the exception of Russia and Serbia, the European states are in favour of the enforcement of values via foreign policy, even if it poses disadvantages. On the surface this seems contradictory, but it seems that for the German, French, Polish,

Ukrainian and Latvian respondents little difference is perceived between enforcing values and serving the interests of their country. On the other hand, the Russian and Serbian surveyed population seem to favour a purely interest driven foreign policy. Therefore, the main challenge for a European security strategy is to reconcile these two different concepts of a legitimate foreign policy.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about security and foreign policy?

■ Strongly agree
 ■ Somewhat agree
 ■ Somewhat disagree
 ■ Strongly disagree
 ∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine



*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

While the acceptance of the premise of political and economic interconnectness due to globalisation is central to introducing a peaceful and integrated security policy strategy in Europe, the main challenge lies in status dissatisfaction, as found especially in Eastern Europe. In this context, even values should be instrumentalised to serve the

respective nations interests. In addition to this explosive mix, core democratic institutions have little legitimacy, and old conflict lines are revived in the context of the current situation of perceived insecurity. Only France and Germany seem to be stable enough to work as an engine to unite Europe in matters of security.

Approaches

What approaches are perceived appropriate in this fragile security situation? It is very instructive to examine how the polled European populations evaluate possible solutions to a real, current and dominant security issue: the Ukrainian conflict.

When asked about possible solutions to the Ukrainian conflict, all respondents – excluding Ukraine – strongly agree with a diplomatic solution and generally agree that their country should stay neutral in the conflict. Correspondingly, all countries (strongly) reject the proposition of their country intervening militarily.

In France and Germany respondents reacted very similarly: almost all offered solutions were rejected, or the respondents were divided on the respective proposal, generally leaning to its rejection. However, in Germany respondents rejected the widening of sanctions and the possible NATO membership of Ukraine more strongly than respondents in France. Both strongly rejected military intervention.

Eastern European countries on the other hand tend to agree with the statement that the crisis is a domestic matter and should be left to Ukraine to solve. Surprisingly this opinion included respondents from Russia and Ukraine. In Ukraine 47% of respondents strongly agree, compared with 41% of Russians, meanwhile 16% of Ukrainian respondents and 23% of Russian respondents somewhat agree with this statement.

Furthermore, and against the background of being directly affected by the crisis, the surveyed Ukrainian population (unlike most of the other countries) did not show a clear rejection of most suggested solutions. The preferred solutions were the widening of sanctions against Russia and EU membership, but Ukrainian respondents share an endorsement of a diplomatic solution with





other European countries. The Ukrainian respondents disagreed with the statement that western partner states should be neutral in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, but at the same time they also disagreed with the suggestion that western partners should intervene militarily in the conflict.

On the other side of the conflict, the surveyed Russian population rejects the proposition that the solution of the conflict should be left to Russia. However, the Russian population is divided concerning neutrality, but is still leaning slightly towards its affirmation. The underlying distribution shows that this solution polarises opinion: 32% strongly agree with this statement, while 26% strongly disagree. Furthermore, the Russian respondents strongly reject the widening of sanctions against their country as well as NATO-membership of Ukraine and show a stronger rejection of the proposed solutions in general. Lastly, it has to be highlighted that the surveyed Russian population – as in other European countries – tended to reject the statement that no third country should intervene in the conflict. But a closer look at the underlying distribution shows that the population is also divided concerning this question: 29% strongly agree with this statement, while 39% strongly disagree.


To summarise, for the Ukrainian respondents the solution to the crisis lies in Western integration. On the other hand, the Russian population is explicitly against this model, but is not inclined to intervene militarily. Meanwhile, the other European countries can only accord to staying neutral and seeking out a diplomatic solution.

Thinking of the Ukrainian conflict, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?


■ Strongly agree
 ■ Somewhat agree
 ■ Somewhat disagree
 ■ Strongly disagree
 ∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine




The Ukraine crisis is a conflict between Ukraine and Russia in which no third country should intervene.




An attempt should be made to find a diplomatic solution involving all conflict parties.



My country should intervene militarily in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.




My country should be neutral regarding the conflict in eastern Ukraine.




*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

Ukraine should become a member of NATO.



Ukraine should become a member of the EU.





*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.

Against this background, at least, a majority of respondents (56%) considers more collaboration with Russia appropriate. This meets with highest approval in Serbia (80%) whereas – not surpris-

singly – Ukraine’s respondents clearly reject this statement (64%). However, a sizeable minority of 27% of Ukrainian respondents want to cooperate.




My country should collaborate more with Russia than before.



Military interventions, even if they seem necessary, are not perceived as a suitable solution to conflicts by any of the polled European states. Even though the Polish and the Russian responses are ambiguous, there is no clear legitimacy for military intervention to solve security issues in Eu-

rope. Correspondingly, there is a clear mandate for relieving tensions in international politics and the peaceful mitigation of conflicts in all European countries. Furthermore, European populations expressed support for having a clear position on conflicts abroad. Foreign and security policy strategies must be clear but non-violent.

■ Strongly agree
 ■ Somewhat agree
 ■ Somewhat disagree
 ■ Strongly disagree
 ∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine



In contrast to the highly perceived influence of NATO, only 52% of all respondents are in favour of a bigger role for this organisation in international political affairs. Moreover, 42% of all respondents explicitly reject this idea. However, a stronger influence of NATO is seen positively in Poland, Ukraine and Latvia and negatively in Serbia. On the





other hand, the EU and UN, which stand for peaceful forms of cooperation between nations, have without exception very high approval ratings. These organisations seem to have the most legitimacy to improve the current security situation in Europe. So does the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.



In your opinion, which of the organisations mentioned should play a bigger role in the future?

* Question answered by those respondents who knew the organisation.

■ Strongly agree, Somewhat agree ■ Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree

∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine





*Deviations to 100% result from 'will remain unchanged', 'do not know' and 'no answer'.


Finally, in none of the polled European countries is the separation of ethnic groups or secessions of regions perceived as a possible solution to national or international security issues in Europe.

The territorial integrity of the state remains the foundation of national and international security and foreign politics.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about security and foreign policy?

∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine

Ethnic groups and parts of countries should in principle have the right to break ties with a state.



Therefore, for a European security strategy, a non-military intervention is preferable and the shared tendency of staying neutral has to be taken into account. If we take the identified challenges seriously, we need strong international

players like Germany and France to combat the nationalisation of foreign and security policy and/or to positively drive a multilateral approach to foreign and security policy.



Country Profiles

- > Germany
- > France
- > Latvia
- > Poland
- > Russia
- > Serbia
- > Ukraine

Germany

[Hesitant and capable]

Public opinion in Germany is strongly swayed by history. Between 1933 and 1945, nationalist leaders led the 'German Reich' into a moral, political and military catastrophe. After the war, the country was divided. In West Germany, society was mainly concerned with coming to terms with and overcoming this experience. For decades, the debate was dominated by the traumatic experience resulting from the military catastrophe and by attempts to grapple with German crimes committed under the Nazi regime. While the reunification of East and West Germany has changed the underlying conditions, a 'post-heroic' attitude continues to prevail in the minds of the people.

Self-perception

Germany stands out among all other polled countries as the most content with its status in the world. The vast majority of German respondents (over 70%) said that they were satisfied with their country's international standing and did not see anyone threatening it. At the same time, cooperation with other countries is viewed as a prerequisite for maintaining Germany's position. Germans consider themselves part of European culture. Some 60% of respondents would also like to see closer cooperation with Russia. It would appear that German society has no desire to adopt an aggressive posture toward the outside world.


Economically, Germans currently feel well-situated, but they are more concerned about climate change than people are elsewhere. Germans are much less concerned about their personal future and economic prospects than other citizens. They do not expect war to break out in Europe and also do not believe that Germany itself could be affected by war. Despite the existence of a general fear of war and terrorism, a deep-seated sense of security prevails, distinguishing German society from those in the other countries surveyed. At the same time, and in stark contrast to this image of

a confident anchor of stability, Germany surprisingly displays the most pessimistic assessment of the future developments in international politics (62% say the situation will worsen) and the global economy (52% fear deterioration).

Ø= Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia
PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine

In view of increasing tensions between Russia and the West, I think new wars in Europe are likely.

■ Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree




Perception of European Security

Threats perceptions are rather underdeveloped in Germany. Only a minority sees the United States (19%) or Russia (15%) as a threat. The picture changes though when respondents rank potential 'enemies'. Paradoxically, top of the list with 39% is the US - a NATO partner that has guaranteed

Germany's military security for decades. This is indicative of latent anti-Americanism in society; however, in view of actions taken by the Trump administration, experts also share the view that the US cannot currently be deemed a reliable partner.

The fact that Turkey ranks second (20%) among the countries perceived as 'enemies' – even ahead of Russia (15%) – can probably be more adequately explained by domestic politics.

In your opinion, which of these countries constitutes the greatest threat for Germany?




More than others, German respondents indicated that they felt threatened by growing nationalism (74%) and disinformation campaigns (77%, second only to Poland). Notably, the fear of uncontrolled immigration is less pronounced in Germany than elsewhere. However, developments within the EU are being observed with great concern. Experts also see the EU as the most important field of action for Germany's foreign policy. In other words Germany can only act globally to help shape international policy if it does so within the framework of the EU.

More than 60% of respondents in Germany consider the annexation of Crimea illegal, and over 70% see Russia as the main culprit for the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis (62% cite the separatists, but 47% blame Ukraine). The overwhelming majority of respondents are in favour of a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. However,

there do not appear to be any ideas as to how this should be achieved: while the solutions currently on the table have garnered little support, experts consistently reject the idea of military intervention. They also expressed concern that Chancellor Merkel's foreseeable departure could jeopardise the existing conflict resolution formats. Neither Russia nor Ukraine were deemed keen on changing the status quo.

The Way Forward

In terms of foreign policy, two-thirds of the respondents are in favour of pursuing primarily national interests, while two-thirds also want foreign policy to assert values. It appears that the majority of Germans see no conflict between values and interests. Experts also take the view that upholding values is part of the national interest.




In Germany, as in France, the organisation of security is primarily focused on the UN and the EU. The OSCE is also accorded a greater role, with NATO taking more of a backseat. Notably, experts discussed the OSCE only in Germany and Russia – others did not mention it in focus groups. The

majority of German respondents advocated diplomatic solutions in international conflicts, much like people in other countries. But a clear two-thirds majority of Germans rejects military action, reflecting an attitude that differs significantly from those in other larger countries.

To ward off dangers for my country it is permitted to carry out military actions in other countries.

∅ = Total



However, a majority wants Germany to play its part in shaping international politics: 69% of respondents call for Germany to take more international responsibility and help other states; and 70% want Germany to pursue an active foreign policy and play a relevant role in resolving international conflicts. Experts however noted that the status quo is sticky: there is a certain lack of motivation and political will to leave the comfort zone and proactively tackle the challenges. The pacifist mindset of the Germans is a contributing factor. Domestic populism further limits room for manoeuvre.

important ally, France, is seen as one solution. A European Security Council is another idea. Experts believed that smaller partners like the Visegrad countries should also be involved. However, many also perceive that domestic political developments in partner countries make this more difficult. Generally, alliances are seen as less stable than before. Despite problems, Russia is viewed as an indispensable partner for solving crises (including the Ukraine conflict). Overall, a certain amount of puzzlement prevails. Although no escalation is expected in Ukraine, there are few ideas as to how the Russian and Ukrainian sides can be persuaded to behave constructively at the negotiating table. It is significant that the experts addressed the issue of societal insecurity, and globalisation leading to the dissolution of certainties. Among other things, in Germany there was a lack of clarity on what actually constitutes the 'West'.

France

[Confident and active]

France has played a special role in security policy for many years. It emerged from the Second World War as one of the victorious powers and, as a result, claimed an independent international role. It sees itself as part of the 'West' but has kept its distance from the United States; for a long time, France was not integrated into NATO's military structures. At the same time, it has built up its own nuclear capacity.

Self-perception

France is one of the crucial countries in the European Union. Accordingly, the EU also occupies an important position in its foreign policy thinking. Nevertheless, experts insist that France must retain its own intelligence and military capabilities. They are also concerned about the future of the EU.

France has no prevailing territorial claims vis-à-vis its neighbours (64% negate this statement); in any case, borders play only a limited role in the EU. French history teaches, however, that borders can be changed and that ethnic groups are to a certain extent entitled to secede from a state (36% support this). At the same time, France, similar to Germany, is fairly satisfied with its status in international relations (only 33% say France does not have the status it deserves in comparison with other countries).

The French population is equally worried about the international economic and international political situation: 47% expect both to deteriorate within the next five years. Regarding their per-


sonal future, only 44% fear that their situation will decline. This is much less than in the other countries surveyed (63% on average). However, the French are concerned about their economic future – 54% (twice the German rating) fear that their situation will deteriorate.

Perception of European Security


Fears of war (77%) and international terrorism (78%) are as high in France as in other countries. However, only a minority of 32% anticipates wars breaking out in Europe. Nevertheless, about 60% assume that wars elsewhere will also affect France.

Only a small group of respondents believe that other countries are a threat to France. A minority regards the United States (13%) or Russia (12%) as a threat. When asked to rank France's 'enemies', 12% of respondents named Russia and 8% China, but as many as 24% cited the United States as the greatest threat for France. Neither the French public nor the country's experts view the crisis-prone situation in the post-Soviet region as of primary importance.

Disinformation campaigns are perceived as a threat, as is nationalism. In France, a higher than average majority sees a rising global population as a threat (58%). Concern regarding uncontrolled immigration (58%) is higher than in Germany, but slightly below average among the countries we investigated. The fear of conflicts within the EU (56%) also ranked lower than in Germany or Poland.




In your opinion, which of these countries constitutes the greatest threat for France?



The conflict in and around Ukraine is seen as important, but not as French foreign policy's central problem. The annexation of Crimea is considered illegal by a majority of respondents (59%). As for the escalation of the Ukraine conflict, 63% assign responsibility to the Russians and 48% to separatists. The overwhelming majority of respondents also favour a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. The expert discussion in Paris also showed that although France is part of the Normandy format, Ukraine and the conflict there do not represent a high foreign policy priority for France.

The Way Forward

A majority of respondents are satisfied with France's international role and do not consider their country constrained by other powers. In terms of foreign policy, a majority in society favour both pursuing national interests (59%) and asserting national values (69%). It is possible that these respondents see no contradiction between these two objectives, even if this may be the case in practice. The French know that they are dependent on international cooperation, see themselves as part of Europe and rely on cooperation within the EU. A majority want a stronger international role for




their country and generally advocate a leadership role for influential states – it can be assumed that they include France in this group. In any case, 69% would like France to pursue an active foreign policy and play an important role in resolving conflicts. On the whole, the French population does not

think much of increasing the influence of international organisations and ranks last in this respect among the four EU member states surveyed.

French society has a fundamentally positive attitude towards its military. After 1945, France waged colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, which are still controversial today. The military operations in the former Yugoslavia, Africa and


Afghanistan, however, are generally accepted also by French society. Compared with the other countries surveyed, the French expressed willingness to use military force (55% favour military action abroad).



Nevertheless, intervention in conflicts is viewed rather sceptically. This shows that although the idea of using the military is well accepted in French society, the government must always justify its use of the military politically. This is also reflected in the fact that the public rejects increases in

defence spending (49%) and wants to bind French foreign policy to the assertion of values (69%). Also remarkable is the 10% lower trust in institutions in comparison with Germany, although with some exceptions, such as the national intelligence service, the police and the military.

To what extent do you trust the following institutions?



For their part, the experts stress the importance of internal stability in their own country and the EU. In terms of security policy, French society relies primarily on the UN and the EU, while NATO and the OSCE are accorded less importance. This

is a plausible approach for a state that relies on its own nuclear force and military capabilities in vital zones of interest and its permanent seat in the UN Security Council.



Latvia


[Ambiguous and pragmatic]

Latvia looks back on a difficult history. In the 18th century it came under the control of Tsarist Russia. The country gained its independence in 1918, but after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1940 Latvia was occupied first by the Red Army and then by the German Wehrmacht. After the Second World War, Latvia was made part of the Soviet Union. Only shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 Latvia regained its independence. In 2004 Latvia joined NATO and the EU. The ethnic Russians constitute almost a quarter of the population. The Russian speaking population is represented in parliament by the party Harmony. It has enjoyed considerable voters' support and is currently governing the capital city of Riga.

Self-perception


More than half of Latvians are unhappy with the status of their country in the world – however, among the 'Eastern Europeans' they are the most relaxed. 64% of respondents do not think that

other countries prevent Latvia from achieving its true greatness. More than any other country, Latvia recognises that its prosperity is linked to the well-being of other countries.



Latvians consider themselves European (92% say they are part of the European cultural sphere, 82% support more collaboration with the EU). At the same time, 88% think that Latvia's unique culture needs to be better protected.

According to experts, the threat of war is a higher concern than social and economic issues. However internal challenges are manifold, such as little trust in institutions, lack of social cohesion and a government-society gap.




Perception of European Security

Latvians are fairly relaxed about international economic and political prospects (36% and 28% respectively think they will improve), in contrast to the much more pessimistic response of the Poles, Germans and French. At the same time, 70% of Latvian respondents are worried that war and conflicts may potentially affect their country.

Thereby Russia is considered a threat, both for security in Europe (50% of respondents think so) and Latvia proper (36%). Asked to rank potential enemies, 57% consider Russia greatest threat (only in Ukraine and Poland is the share higher). The experts group noted that Russia is the 'constituting other' for Latvia: historical experience of Russian oppression and occupation was very for-

mative, so that insecurity can be considered part of the Latvian DNA.

At the same time, stronger cooperation with Russia has strong support in society (61%). With a rating of 84%, Latvia leads the poll in citing lack of cooperation as influencing relations of many of the European states with Russia.



Experts named the EU and NATO as important allies. Since the US plays a mental stabilising role in Latvia, the current 'unlike-mindedness' of the transatlantic community poses a challenge. Within the EU, Poland is considered crucial in terms of military supplies, being the outer defence line for Latvia even in the doomsday scenario of a NATO collapse. Germany is considered Latvia's top partner in Western Europe. In this context the current rift within the EU might pose a difficult choice for Latvia if it had to choose between Germany or Poland. The survey buttresses this assessment: disagreement within the EU worries 43% of Latvians, which is 10% more than in neighbouring Poland or Germany.

The Way Forward

Like respondents in other countries, Latvians support peaceful mitigation of conflicts. 65% of Latvians reject military interventions abroad (only


France, Russia and Poland are pro intervention). The same pattern holds when asked about general military intervention in conflicts - 64% of Latvians are against it. Interestingly, among all polled countries Latvia's population demonstrates the highest support for taking sides in conflicts (76%).

Within the 'Eastern' camp Latvia stands out in rejecting increased military spending (52%). Here Latvians share the attitudes of the German and French public, who are sceptical of re-militarisation. On the question of assuming more responsibility and pursuing an active foreign policy, Latvia is positioned in the middle between 'East' and 'West': 70% of respondents want Latvia to play a significant role in solving international problems and crises.

The expert group discussion revealed a high awareness of own responsibility: many of Latvia's security problems were recognised as self-inflicted. The slogan 'The Russians are coming!' is often


used as an excuse to avoid dealing with important domestic issues such as health and education. Therefore, tackling domestic problems was consi-

dered to be helpful for dealing with external threats, even though it might be politically unpopular.



Interests are important in foreign policy (85% think interests should be represented without restriction), just as in other 'Eastern' countries.

At the same time, more than in any other polled country, the Latvian population has a stake in a value-based foreign policy (82%).



On the Ukrainian crisis, Latvians strongly support staying neutral (69%) and reject military intervention (92%). A thin majority of 47% supports NATO membership of Ukraine, but 42% oppose it. Experts perceive the Ukrainian conflict as a two-country conflict (41% of the population agree), which is hard to solve from the outside. The view is that there are few face-saving options for Ukraine and Russia, so 'muddling through' may be the most likely strategy for the near future. In the meantime, drawing on its transformation experience, Latvia could help Ukraine improve issues of governance.

For the future of European security, experts saw deterrence and dialogue as important complementary components. The limited presence of NATO troops in Latvia is viewed as an important symbolic sign of like-mindedness and re-assurance. At the same time, dialogue was described not as a signal of weakness or concession, but rather as an important sign of self-confidence showing that it is able to engage with an opponent.



Poland



[Concerned and aspiring]

Poland looks back on a difficult history. There had been no Polish state since the Polish divisions in the 18th century. It was not until 1918 that Poland regained its sovereignty, which was again dismantled in 1939 by the 'German Reich' and the Soviet Union. In 1945 a new state emerged, but it was firmly integrated into the 'socialist camp'. It was not until 1989 that Polish society forced a political change. Poland gained foreign policy capacity, renounced its ties to the Soviet Union and joined NATO in 1999. The long history of its struggle for sovereignty to a certain degree shapes the attitudes of Polish society today.

Self-perception

Polish society is not satisfied with the country's international position. A majority of 67% believes that Poland does not occupy its deserved place in the world and that there are powers actively limiting its international role (52%). At the same time, an overwhelming majority perceives that Poland

is dependent on international cooperation (83%). Poles see themselves as Europeans, and closer cooperation is desired despite Poland's conflicts with the EU. Even if there are glimmers of a revisionist foreign policy, the idea that Poland needs to be integrated into the 'West' prevails.



Perception of European Security

Overall, the Polish public is concerned about the development of international politics. The dangers for the world economy and international politics are expected to increase over the next five years.

Fear of war and international terrorism is as strong in Poland as it is in other countries. A majority (79%) assumes that Poland would immediately feel the effects of war.


While only a minority of respondents indicated that the growth of the world's population is problematic (35%), fear of uncontrolled immigration is well above average (66%). Conflicts within the EU are also viewed with concern by 64% of respondents.

Russia is named as a threat by 51% of respondents, 79% name it as the main source of threat to Poland – more than in any other polled country. Experts add that Russia uses the weaknesses that derive from within the EU, such as instability on its eastern edge, lack of internal cohesion, and Brexit, from which Poland faces the prospect of large losses in economic terms. Poland’s struggle with the EU is viewed as a new dimension of Polish foreign policy.

76% of respondents considered the annexation of Crimea illegal. For the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict 82% blame Russia and 51% the separatists. An overwhelming majority of respondents are in favour of a diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine crisis. However, more than 60% back expanding the current sanctions, which makes Poland the only country apart from Ukraine where the majority supports expanding sanctions. Over 60% of Poles believe that Ukraine should become a member of NATO and the EU. At the same time, 73% reject the idea of a military intervention in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Sanctions against Russia should be widened.


∅ = Total



The Way Forward


In determining foreign policy goals, 76% of respondents are in favour of pursuing national interests, and two-thirds believe foreign policy should

assert values. It is apparent that Polish society assumes that promulgated values dovetail with national interests.



For respondents in Poland security is assured above all by the UN and NATO, the latter being an exception compared to other surveyed countries. When it comes to which organisation should play a bigger role in the future, the EU is in fourth place in Poland while in the other three EU countries, the EU is always supported in second place (behind the UN). Expert assessment differed, emphasising that Polish foreign policy can be effective only through collaboration with the EU, which it considers to be the main forum for showing that Poland matters.

In Poland, as in other countries, a large majority of respondents are in favour of resolving conflicts through diplomatic channels. However, about half also consider the use of military force to be permissible. Consequently, a majority (68%) supports increasing military spending, second only to Serbia. Poles lead the poll in terms of supporting the right of self-determination: 42% believe that ethnic groups or parts of countries have the right to break ties with a state.



A majority of Poles advocate a leading role for influential states (64%) and want their country to play a stronger international role. 83% want Poland to pursue an active foreign policy and play an important role in resolving conflicts – the highest number in the poll, and a view held in common with Russia. The expert group discussed, among other things, Poland assuming a leading role in the region (Visegrad countries and Baltics), citing the example of the Three Seas Initiative, and at the same time striving to play in the ‘bigger league’, by collaborating with France and Germany. Germany is often portrayed as an enemy in the official discourse, but in fact only 11% of the respondents consider Germany a threat to Poland.

The experts in the focus group favour a pragmatic approach. With Russia, the view is that communication channels should be kept open, including contacts between academics and younger generations (52% of the population support more cooperation with Russia) without disavowing the threat from Russia. Relations with Ukraine are regarded as difficult – also for historical reasons – especially since many in Poland do not see much support in Ukraine for Polish initiatives. Experts also note that Poland is not part of any crisis resolution format, but nevertheless felt that a solution would require a different Russia. EU cohesion is important; in this context Poland seeks to play a relevant role. Otherwise adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach is seen as the most realistic option for Poland.

Russia

[Assertive and challenging]

For society in Russia today, the collapse of the Soviet Union remains a traumatic experience. The elites and the majority of the population remember well that the Soviet Union was ‘the other superpower’ along with the US and the leading power in the ‘socialist camp’. The loss of this position and the experience of economic and social decline in the 1990s have shaped the attitudes of Russian society to this day. The attitude of the ‘West’ is perceived as hostile, and the enlargement of the EU and NATO is seen as an aggressive policy aimed at Russia.


Self-perception

As a consequence, the majority of respondents in the survey perceive that Russia does not occupy its rightful place in the world (56%) and that there are powers actively striving to limit Russia’s international role (69%).

However, there is also a perception that Russia is dependent on the positive development and well-being of other countries (62%), even though this figure is the lowest among all polled countries. Moreover, three-quarters of respondents see themselves as part of Europe, while at the same time an even larger share asserts that Russia has its own separate culture.

A significant minority (44%) in Russian society believes it has territorial claims against neighbours. On the other hand, more people than in any other polled country - 54% - believe that borders are inviolable.


A narrow majority (52%) thinks that ethnic minorities have no right to secede from a state. This stance contradicts the attitude of the Russian government with regard to Ukraine and Georgia, but is in line with the principles of Soviet foreign policy as enshrined in the Helsinki Accords.




∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia
PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine

■ Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree

The prosperity of my country is in many respects linked to the well-being and positive development of other countries.



Borders have always been changed by wars and this will continue to be the case in the future.




All in all, Russians look to the future with optimism, expecting positive developments over the next five years in both the political and economic spheres (with ratings of 38%). Remarkably, citi-

zens of other polled countries expressed less optimism. However, Russians' expectations for their personal futures stand in stark contrast, as a majority of respondents expressed marked concern.

If I think of the various developments in my country and in the world, I am concerned about my personal future.

∅ = Total



Perception of European Security

A majority of Russian respondents expects wars to have an impact on their own country (70%) or on Europe (59%). Interviewed experts expressed their concern at the crisis in the arms control system (including the threats to terminate the INF Treaty), however noting that the risk of incidents is more probable than the danger of a large-scale war.

Against the backdrop of the current situation, almost 80% of Russian respondents cite the threat posed by the US and NATO as their top concern. More than half of them also view the enlargement of the EU negatively. Almost 90% of respondents support the annexation of Crimea. Improved cooperation with the EU is currently hampered by


the Ukraine crisis and sanctions (77%), as well as by the US (82%) and EU interference in Russia's internal affairs (74%). Just like respondents in other countries, Russians also perceive disinformation campaigns as a threat (73%).

Responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis is attributed to Ukraine (83%) and the US (82%), followed by the separatists (55%) and the EU (57%). The overwhelming majority of Russian respondents are in favour of a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Apparently there is no special preference for more concrete approaches: two-thirds of the Russian survey participants would like to leave the solution to Ukraine, and 70% reject a military intervention. This indicates that society is not necessarily the locus for pushing aggressive Russian action in the region.

The Way Forward

In contrast to all other polled countries, more than half of the Russians surveyed rejected the notion of a stronger international responsibility for their country (58%). However, the overwhelming majority advocates a leadership role for influential sta-

tes. It can be assumed that they see Russia as an influential state. In any case, 83% would like Russia to pursue an active foreign policy and assume an important role in resolving conflicts.



The majority of those surveyed would like to see Russian foreign policy pursue national interests (84%) and reject using it to enforce values (56%). This was echoed in the expert discussion, with opinion often revolving around pursuing deals based on interests (*dogovoritsa*), which illustrates a transactional approach to foreign policy. Two-thirds want Russia to take a clear position in conflicts, indicating that this attitude dovetails with the superpower policies pursued by the Russian leadership.

The majority of respondents in Russia rely primarily on the UN, the OSCE and the post-Soviet organisations of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to assure security. It is not surprising that only a minority (but 40% nevertheless) wants NATO to play an important role. There is obviously considerable potential for conflict with the EU, but two-thirds of respondents would still like to see closer cooperation.

An overwhelming majority of respondents are in favour of conflict resolution through diplomatic channels, while about half of respondents also consider the use of military force permissible. Consequently, a majority also supports increasing military spending (53%). Experts maintained that the resolution of the Ukraine crisis is a prerequisite for an improvement in Russia-West relations.

In light of this difficult situation, the proposed solutions discussed in the focus groups were centered on taking realistic steps. In particular, experts were insistent on the importance of maintaining dialogue despite the crisis in relations, both within the NATO-Russia Council and in other formats. The NATO-Russia Founding Act was considered a last resort preventing the slide into a new Cold War.

A recommitment to the Helsinki principles and arms control was viewed as sensible. A restoration of 'bipolarity,' i.e. a return to an international model as formulated in Yalta in 1945 was also discussed, notably as a source of cooperation rather than confrontation. However, room for cooperation was considered limited as Russia is not prepared to admit mistakes, including its military presence in the Donbass.

Compromise is generally considered a sign of weakness. Making a comparison with the EU's pragmatic relations with China, Russian experts suggested removing the 'stumbling block of democracy' from EU's relations with Russia, by simply acknowledging different types of governance and taking it from there. In any case – and this is also expressed in the surveys – experts expect relations to be carried out 'on an equal footing', including the acceptance of Russia as a great power with consideration given to its interests.



Serbia

[Dissatisfied and balancing]

The most decisive landmark in recent Serbian history was the Kosovo war (1998-1999), in which NATO intervened. After Kosovo became independent in 2008, Serbia pursued the policy of non-recognition. Serbia formally adheres to the policy of military neutrality and has been a candidate country for EU membership since 2014.



Self-perception

The Serbian population is the least content with the status of the country. An overwhelming majority of 85% think that Serbia does not have the status in the world that it deserves and 75% believe

that other countries prevent it from achieving true greatness. At the same time, similar to Latvia and Poland, Serbia strongly connects its prosperity to the well-being of other countries (83%).

∅ = Total DE=Germany FR=France LV=Latvia PL=Poland RU=Russia RS=Serbia UA=Ukraine

In my opinion, my country does not have the status in the world it deserves in comparison with other countries.




According to expert assessment, Serbia's foreign policy represents a balancing act between four pillars: the US and the EU on the one side and China and Russia on the other. Among the main foreign policy goals stated are: joining the EU; not joining NATO; and working against the recognition of Kosovo. The Serbian ruling elite is described as a 'stabilocracy': in order to maintain legitimacy, policy makers engage in warmongering and then solve alleged crises. The Kosovo issue seems central to Serbia's self-perception. On the one hand it is viewed as a burden, limiting Serbia's foreign policy options, whilst on the other hand, it provides an element of balancing and maintenance of the status quo.

Second only to Russia, and in contrast to other polled states, Serbia sees the EU in conflict with its interests (70% compared to 55% on average). More than other countries Serbia is highly aware of its cultural uniqueness (94% compared to 80% on average).

Perception of European Security

Most Serbian respondents are worried that war can affect their country (69%). However, only 49% think that wars in Europe are likely in view of increasing Russia-West tensions. The majority (74%) are concerned about their personal futures.

From the Serbian perspective, the largest threats to European security are posed by the USA (71%), NATO enlargement (71%) and EU expansion towards the East (47%). Only the Russian population evaluates these threats more gravely. Among the threats mentioned by experts were the current unpredictability of the international system, the breakdown of multilateralism and the rise of populism.



More than three quarters of the population does not perceive Russia as a threat. Russian actions in Crimea are approved by 54% (26% think it was an annexation). Although the expert discussion revealed Russia as a threat, it concluded that Russia was not a root cause of conflicts in Europe but rather a contributor to their emergence. In the experts' opinion, the situation in Ukraine echoed the situation in Serbia, with some people taking the view that 'we can take back Kosovo just as the Russians took Crimea.'


The Way Forward

The way forward for Serbia seems to strongly depend on the resolution of the Kosovo issue. Experts named two options: a territorial option, leading to partition or territory swap, or a 'German model', alluding to the division of Germany during the Cold War and amounting to normalisation without recognition. An option of 'trading' recognition of Kosovo for a promise of EU membership was deemed unacceptable. In any case, resolution of the Kosovo issue would end Serbia's dependence on Russia and China as the

most prominent 'non-recognisers' in the international community.

In line with the policy of balancing, the Serbian population desires more collaboration with both the EU (71%) and with Russia (80%). Only a small fraction (6%) believes that sanctions against Russia should be widened. The favourable attitude towards the Russians is linked to its vehement non-recognition of Kosovo and goes back to the times of the Cold War. This echoes the focus group assessment, according to which Serbia calls anyone who rejects Kosovo an ally.

Nonetheless the EU member states (which, with the exception of Spain, recognise Kosovo) are viewed as important partners. More than most other polled countries Serbia would like to see the EU grow closer together as one cultural community (83%). This corresponds with the assessment in the focus group: the EU can guarantee stability in Europe only if it is unified, strengthened as player in international relations, and addresses the concerns that gave rise to populism. A change in Russia-West relations is expected to occur only when other rulers come to power in crucial capitals.




In strong contrast to other countries and felt even more keenly than in Russia, Serbian respondents favour interests rather than values in foreign policy. A clear majority of 61% - twice the average rating - rejects the proposition that foreign policy should enforce values even if it poses disadvantages. Following its own interests without restriction is approved by 84% of Serbs, a rating that is very similar to other 'Eastern' countries (83% on average) and in contrast to the 'Western' camp (Germany 66% and France 59%). Expert assessment corroborates this result: Serbian foreign policy bypasses liberal values such as human rights or the fight against climate change, and is based on the hard concept of security.

Neutral Serbia has a somewhat peculiar attitude to the military. On the one hand, the country stands out through its strong endorsement of neutrality (83%), also regarding its stance in the Ukraine conflict (85%, compared to 59% on average). Reactions towards military intervention were much stronger by Serbs than by respondents of other countries. Serbs reject the idea of having a Responsibility to Protect (military interventions abroad to ward off dangers) and clearly oppose their own military intervention in conflicts (72% and 71% respectively).

On the other hand, Serbia also leads the poll in endorsing increased military spending (77%) and believing that borders can and will be changed by wars (71%). However, as regards taking sides in conflicts, Serbia is similarly divided as Germany and France, with a slight majority opposing it (50%). This stands in strong contrast to other 'Eastern' countries polled, where clear majorities support taking sides. Perhaps connected to that, the Serbian population least of all expects influential states to take a leadership role in international politics (42%).

The Ukrainian conflict is viewed controversially: 74% of respondents - the highest number of all polled countries - view it as a domestic matter and believe that the solution should be left to Ukraine. At the same time, a staggering 81% think it is a conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The expert group believes that the solution to the Ukraine crisis is linked to an agreement between major powers because they take more responsibility. Experts underline a lack of sense of urgency in tackling the crisis, noting that the Ukrainian ruling class seems comfortable with the status quo and uses the unfavourable situation as a rally cry.



Ukraine


[Struggling and transformative]

The conflict in and around Ukraine is not the only cause of the current disarray of security in Europe; many more issues underlie it, some of which go back considerably more than five years. Nevertheless, the past five years have been dominated by conflict management in Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian society has been undergoing a deep transformation after the establishment of a new government in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests. This situation however is not unique - one might look back to 1991 and 2004 in this regard. With this change of government came a new push for nation-building. The Russian annexation of Crimea and the hostilities in the Donbass have functioned as catalysts of a more antagonistic and radicalised approach to national identity, reflected in a number of key dimensions, including language, religion, education and history.

Self-perception

After five turbulent years one can observe an adaptation to the new economic and political conditions. Ukrainians are quite relaxed about their future economic prospects even in the face of rising prices and an economic situation that has been deteriora-

ting since 2014. Only 44% think that their economic situation or that of their family will deteriorate in the future, but the vast majority – 83% – are concerned about their personal future, given developments in Ukraine and the world more generally.



2019 is 'super election' year in Ukraine. The outcome of the upcoming presidential election is perceived as crucial for the country's development trajectory. Ukrainians are dissatisfied with their country's global status. According to the poll, 74% believe that Ukraine does not have the status in the world that it deserves. Another very worrisome issue is the fragile state of trust in the main domestic institutions, which is described in Chapter 2. The only trusted institution is the army, which is also a cornerstone of the election campaign of current president Petro Poroshenko.

The survey shows that Ukrainians are among the strongest proponents of further European integration (76%), based on a keen sense of a shared European culture (79%). In Ukraine, this manifests itself in the clearest commitment among all the countries surveyed to greater cooperation with the EU (79%). Having said that, 27% favour more cooperation with Russia, which once again highlights Ukraine's very special situation and its relations with East and West.

Perception of European Security

According to Ukrainian experts, ambiguity and uncertainty loom large in the security landscape of the Euro-Atlantic zone. One major problem is disagreement about clear threat perceptions in the Western (EU/NATO) camp. According to experts in Kyiv the Ukrainian government should improve its relations with all regional partners,

because in the current circumstances no partner is unimportant. This applies in particular to positive developments in relations with Hungary. Overall, however, the experts emphasise the importance of 'heavyweight' partners, such as the United States, Canada, Poland and Germany, which implies, conversely, a lower agency for their own country. Russia was not mentioned as a partner in any sense, although there is still economic cooperation, which currently is even growing.

The ambivalent attitude within Ukraine towards Russia, potential accession to Western organisations and the separatist conflict in the country are illustrated by the following data.


For respondents in Ukraine the main enemy is, by a large margin over other named states, Russia (73%), followed at a considerable distance by the United States (11%).

The central foreign policy issue in Ukraine in recent years has been its aspiration to members-




hip of various international institutions, which for the Ukrainian elite symbolises affiliation to the West and, at the same time, fundamental differentiation from Russia. Among organisations mentioned by name, Ukrainians distinguish quite clearly between the EU, accession to which is favoured by 73%, and NATO, favoured by only 56%. At the same time, 52% of respondents believe that eastern enlargement of both the EU and NATO are responsible for the current tension between the

Ukraine should become a member of the EU.



Ukraine should become a member of NATO.




West and Russia, and that NATO's 'encroachment' on the Russian border poses a threat to European security (37%). This response is surprising only at first glance; the relatively low – 56% – approval of NATO accession among the general public is strikingly different from the high level of approval in the expert community in Kyiv, which sees joining both the EU and NATO as a foreign policy priority.

The Way Forward

Finding a way out of this tense security situation in Europe depends on finding a viable solution to the conflict in and around Ukraine.

This conflict has a prominent place in this study, so it is especially interesting to look at Ukrainian society. After all, 54% of Ukrainians say that Ukraine is responsible for the outbreak of conflict within its borders. From the point of view of Ukrainian focus group participants, the key to the resolution of and responsibility for the conflict in the east of the country lies in Moscow. Scepticism was also expressed concerning a possible blue-helmet mission in the Donbass, because of the hostility of the Kremlin. Looking at the statements in the population about the conflict in their own country, the picture looks different.



Remarkably, 63% favour domestic conflict resolution ('it should be left to Ukraine') which could mean both a 'de-occupation' of the uncontrolled territories or negotiations with representatives of the so-called Peoples Republics to achieve reintegration of the breakaway region. By contrast, only 52% support a UN mission.

Neither neither the experts nor the general public consider a military solution to the conflict as a way out, however, 63% say that regionalisation is preferable to internationalising the conflict ('The conflict is a domestic matter and should be left to Ukraine'). In this context, it was also important to the Ukrainian experts that a 'Transnistrian scenario' – whereby unilateral concessions would be made to the separatist side – should be prevented by all means. It would

only cement Russia's influence over the country. Given that Kyiv wants to reintegrate the separatist regions, initiating political dialogue with actors in the breakaway regions will be crucial, as will be its scope.

As regards the future of European security, experts saw initiation of a broader dialogue on threat perceptions – in all possible areas, including migration and the influence of Russian and China – as a promising measure to boost mutual understanding among European actors.

Ukrainians are strongly in favour of an active foreign policy (78%) oriented to national interests (88%). This at least represents a solid basis in the search for complementary interests in security policy, both regionally and internationally.

A stylized map of Europe is shown on the left side of the page, rendered in white outlines against a light gray background. Several stars and arrows are scattered across the map, pointing in various directions. The right side of the page is a solid blue color with a decorative pattern of concentric white lines on the right edge.

Steps Towards a European Security Process

"I hope the dark clouds in the political heavens will soon disperse."

"Our modern wars make many unhappy while they last, and no one happy when they are over."

Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Italian Journey

Rome, 6th of September 1787

Steps Towards a European Security Process

I. Status Quo: Unstable

We need to be concerned about Europe. This, in short, can be concluded from the Security Radar 2019 opinion survey. This applies not only within the European Union, which is usually assumed to be the entire continent, but also within greater Europe, which includes countries like Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. The volatility of international affairs frightens people. But despite the tensions, the Security Radar survey does not detect a belligerent mood among the people. Respondents would like to see their governments cooperate more with other states and solve challenges by peaceful means. In this brief final analysis, the most interesting findings of the survey, together with the results of the focus groups, will be put into perspective in the current European security environment.

With this aim, the status quo of European security according to public and expert opinion will be briefly summarised with an eye towards answering the following question: How can we achieve a stable future cooperative European security architecture in light of the diverse perspectives and opinions of the three different groups of countries that comprise Europe today? Three recommendations will conclude the analysis.

To evaluate the potential for future cooperative European security architecture against the background of these findings, one needs first to examine the current status quo of security in Europe. While there is no major war on the horizon, the security situation is very complicated and dangerous. The conflict in and around Ukraine, with Russia's involvement, can be considered as a war within Europe. Nor should one forget the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Transnistria and in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the Russian annexation of Crimea. Moreover, the status of Kosovo has not been completely resolved.

There is more reason for concern. Steps that seemed possible in Europe after the Cold War – conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in Europe – are under heavy stress. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), introduced in 1992 mainly to create a secure and stable balance of conventional ar-

med forces and to reduce military capabilities to prevent surprise attacks or massive offensives in Europe, has not been renewed. The Open Skies Treaty (OST) of 2002, established to regulate observation flights by states over the territories of other states, is currently not working very well. And the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures from 2011, which was originally designed in 1990, is constantly being violated.

In general, the Charter of Paris in 1990, 'For a New Europe', which was a guideline for Europe entering the 21st century, has proved to be over-optimistic. Europe is far from being united. It is true that the military potential on the part of both NATO and especially Russia is much smaller than in 1991. But Russia is still capable and has shown that it can militarily escalate a conflict in Europe and harm its neighbours.

As if this were not enough, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles between Russia and the US is under threat. Washington will most probably walk out soon. This could lead to the stationing of new cruise missiles in Europe, a reminder of the situation in the 1980s during the Cold War. New threats to crucial infrastructure from cyber-attacks, combined with increased propaganda activities, to the development of new weapons systems have taken place without any clear understanding of how to curb this development.

To sum up, the status quo of European security is unstable and the populations of the seven participating countries – France, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine – for good reason sense that they are living in an unsafe environment. The chance of warfare in Europe is seen as a clear possibility. This worrying observation implies that it is time to act.

II. Ideas to Start a Political Process

The seven countries whose populations were surveyed have been sorted into three groups, each with different perspective on foreign and security policy according to our analysis of the results of

the poll. France and Germany are two of the largest EU countries with high political and economic capabilities. They are not seen as a threat by their neighbours, have the potential to bridge differences with Russia and could be therefore seen as responsible and capable of pushing for cooperative security architecture in Europe. Latvia, Poland, Serbia and Ukraine are four countries that are either members of, or at least associated with the EU but are having difficulties finding their role in a larger Europe. Russia, which is still the only European major power from a military perspective and is involved militarily in a neighbouring country, is clearly also struggling to establish its desired role as an important foreign policy actor in Europe and the world.

The countries were assigned to the three groups on the basis of similar responses to the survey questions by the countries' respondents. Although it should be noted that in some dimensions of the survey there were national peculiarities and varying similarities with other states which were described in chapter 3.

(1) The Central Eastern Europeans – Latvians, Poles and Ukrainians, together with Serbs – despite having substantially different views on Russia, share a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo: they feel undervalued, and in general they support increased military spending. A majority of their populations, especially Poles, believe also that their countries should take more responsibility in foreign policy.

(2) The same is true for Russians. The population of the major military power in Europe also feels underappreciated and thinks that other countries are hindering their country's development. The Russians also very strongly believe that their country should pursue an active foreign policy and that influential states should assume responsibility in international relations. Nevertheless, Russia deserves a separate grouping because a considerable share of the Central Eastern European public sees it as a threat to their security.

(3) The French and Germans are quite content with the current role of their state in international affairs: they are not threatening other countries, nor do they feel particularly threatened. Still, the majority of both populations are of the opinion that their countries should be more active in security policy matters, with the difference that the French would be more willing to use military force than the Germans.


Nevertheless, one should not look at these three groups and their respective perspectives on foreign and security policy as cast in stone. Some of the opinions of the Poles and Latvians float between Germany and France on the one side and Russia on the other side. The same goes for almost all the other countries too. They seem to want to reorient themselves. Trajectories of the EU, transatlantic bonds, as well as alliances are being questioned. No path is predetermined. Convictions can change. But still, the patterns are solid enough to offer these three groupings of countries as a reasonable starting point for discussion.

What are the challenges for the future security architecture, given these three different conceptions of European security, which are based on different historical developments and different experiences following the end of the Cold War? What are the entry points if one of these groups were to start a process of rebuilding a European consensus or at least a compromise? What could be their main impetus for the future of a secure Europe? And finally: What are the common takeaways of the three perspectives that could be used to start an urgently needed political process?

Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine: The Worried

All four of these countries are either member states of the EU or closely associated with it. They have experienced differing levels of economic prosperity since 1991. Latvia and Poland are success stories; Serbia and Ukraine are still struggling. What they have in common is their uneasiness about the status quo in European security affairs. The population of these countries, except for Latvia, feel that they do not have the status they deserve, and even worse, they perceive that other countries are undermining their efforts.

Threat Perception vs. Legitimacy of Institutions



This statistical analysis validates our main finding that reveals the dire status quo of European security. We combined items to build two sum scores: one measures the general threat perception, and the other – the legitimacy of central institutions in society.

The **'General Threat Perception Score'** consists of seven items of the question 'To what extent are you personally concerned about the following current events that are frequently discussed at the moment? Wars and conflicts; international terrorism; climate change; economic crises; uncontrolled immigration; disagreement/conflict within the EU; growing world population.' The sum-score has a sufficient internal consistency ($\alpha=0.734$). A value of 1 corresponds with the perception of no threat at all, and a value of 4 implies a very high threat perception.

The **'Legitimacy of Institutions Score'** consists of eight items of the question 'To what extent do you trust the following institutions of your country? Head of state; government; parties; media; courts; intelligence services; police; military.' The sum-score has a good internal consistency ($\alpha=0.817$). A value of 1 represents a very low overall legitimacy of institutions, and a value of 4 - a very high legitimacy of institutions.

The sum scores do not correlate with each other ($r=0.065^{**}$). Thus, they represent two different dimensions. In the system of coordinates, the points are defined as the combination of the respective arithmetic means of the two sum-scores for each country.

The general legitimacy of societal institutions is alarmingly low in all polled countries. In Poland and Ukraine in particular, institutions suffer a severe lack of legitimacy. Only in Germany are institutions perceived as relatively legitimate, but even so, not in a convincing manner. All countries exhibit a high level of general threat perception.

The combination of the two sum-scores paints a grim picture. People's sense of security depends on their perception of threats and their belief in the legitimacy of institutions. The data show a highly unstable situation, in which society is afraid and does not believe that the authorities responsible for dealing with the challenges are in a legitimate position to do so. This creates an environment in which hasty measures and extreme forms of foreign and security policies easily find popular support.

Poles, Serbs and Ukrainians particularly, according to the survey and focus groups, perceive their past in a more positive light than the uncertain future. According to experts consulted in the study, this has to do with the fact that political decision makers look more towards traditions and the past rather than towards the unknown future. History is back in geopolitics. Maybe it never left. The populations of the Central Eastern European states remain influenced by the still-painful wounds inflicted during the last hundred years, or even before (Polish partitions), mainly by Russia, but also by Germany.

Whereas Latvia and Poland have strong reassurances for their security through NATO membership, Serbia and Ukraine lack this. It is interesting that despite the different membership status of these four states, there is very little difference in the populations' threat perceptions and the dissatisfaction with their current standing in international affairs, and only some differences in their support for increasing their countries' military spending.

However, one major challenge for European security architecture is the different understanding of the threat. For Latvians, Poles and Ukrainians it is Russia; for Serbia it is the US. There is also a common understanding that the US is a major factor influencing security in Europe. The expert focus group in Poland pointed out that the policy of looking towards the US for shortcuts in security matters, rather than finding common ground within the EU, could alienate other EU member states. Another challenge for a united approach in the current European security environment is the strong support of Latvia and Poland for Ukraine's NATO membership, while the French and the Germans show far less support, not to mention Russia, which is of course opposed. Indeed, the support in Ukraine itself (56%) is remarkably low compared with its Western partners.

All four countries are still shaken by the past and the injustices that were done to them. More than half of the population in Latvia, Poland, Serbia and Ukraine (and in Russia as well), believes that parts of the territory of neighbouring countries should be part of their own country. In addition to that, there is an overall perception that borders have always been changed by wars and that this will continue to be the case in the future.

The people have not come to terms with their tragic history and its traumas, a fact which to some extent drives their respective international policies. No doubt Russia's current behaviour only

exacerbates these factors, rather than alleviating them.

For the four countries in Central Eastern and Southern Europe the entry points for initiating a new security process is the overall understanding that Europe should grow together; that conflicts can be solved using peaceful means; and that cooperation with Russia could be intensified. Even 27% of Ukrainians favour more cooperation with Russia.

According to the experts surveyed, all these countries recognise their limits with regard to foreign policy, and their populations are thus open to non-violent solutions to the crisis in and around Ukraine. Binding international norms and laws are essential. The Ukrainian population sees its own country as the main actor for resolving the crisis, using diplomatic solutions. This approach would be extremely useful for developing cooperative security architecture.

Russia: Status Seeking

Russians have gone through major upheavals and transformations since 1991. Many lost political guidance along with their jobs or savings, and even hope for a better future. Others saw a rare chance for improvement. Perceiving the end of the Cold War more as a challenge rather than an opportunity, Russians are nonetheless pragmatic. The country is more stable than one could have imagined, even though economically and politically there is still no consistent path to prosperity and stability. But then again, what country in Europe is not in that difficult situation? One just has to look at Great Britain. However, the Russian population still does not feel that its country is fairly represented in international affairs. It is no wonder that it supports an increase in military spending and military interventions abroad. International politics, according to Russians, is based primarily on interests, not on values. The Russian government is following a principle of looking for ad hoc alliances that can be changed according to its interests.

Experts of the Russian focus group emphasise that the security architecture that was established after the Cold War was not created for serious rivalry but rather for a friendly environment. Moreover, they point out that it fails to reflect the current military strength of Russia, which would enable Russia to pursue an active foreign policy. Therefore, Moscow is looking for new security architecture, without officially denouncing the old one based on the Helsinki Final Act from 1975.

The challenge is that there are very few allies Russia can count on. Most Europeans see Russia as a serious threat -not only because of the Ukrainian case but also because of the values gap and Russian interference in the affairs of other European states. Only Russians and Serbians in part consider the annexation of Crimea legal. Furthermore, Russians feel that EU policies are regularly in conflict with their country. It seems that Russia is very much looking inwards. Its own unique culture is important, and it feels threatened by the interference of others and by the Eastern expansion of NATO in general – and especially by possible EU and NATO membership of Ukraine.

Still, entry points for Russia's engagement towards a cooperative European security remain. One is the prevailing public perception that there is a common Europe and that Russia is part of it. Thus, even though it seems almost to contradict their critical stance towards the EU, Russians are asking for more collaboration with Brussels. Another is the strong support for a diplomatic solution to the Ukrainian conflict and a stance against military intervention by other countries in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Russia is needed but at the same time Russia is feared. This has been the case since Russian troops overpowered the French and Russia became part of the European concert of powers in 1815. Until now its foreign policy has been mostly seen as the result of domestic authoritarian developments and therefore not driven by any rational foreign policy with the interests of a major European power. But according to the survey, Russians see their country as part of Europe and would like it to stay engaged.


This stands in contrast to their feeling of not being treated well in international European affairs, which they compensate for with a foreign policy that, especially because of its might, it is ready to escalate and to use force. Including Russia in security talks could be a first step to giving Russians the status they long for. At the same time their government has to act as a responsible power.

France and Germany: Responsibility to Lead

Both France and Germany could be envisioned as suitable initiators of an attempt to work on cooperative European security architecture. Their people feel respected in Europe, they do not feel pressured by other states, and they have no desire for territories in neighbouring countries. Their policy is geared towards stability in and around the EU but because of a rapid changing foreign policy environment they are willing to start new thinking on European security, which is officially still based on the 2010 OSCE Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community. The essence is expressed in point 3: 'The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. Each participating State has an equal right to security.' But according to the opinion poll, the French and the Germans are instinctively asking for more political involvement by their respective governments.

Against this background, the hot or smouldering conflicts such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and foremost the illegal annexation of Crimea and the on-going conflict in the Donbass must be resolved. Partners for a French and German initiative could be found among the countries of the Eastern Partnership and EU member states as well as Russia.

Perceived Status vs. Responsibility



This statistical analysis illustrates the extent to which the seven countries polled for the Security Radar 2019 survey can be drivers of an inclusive security and peace strategy in Europe. The perceived status of the respondents' country was contrasted with the popular support for a foreign and security policy that assumes international responsibility.

The concept of '**international status**' was assessed through the item 'In my opinion, my country does not have the status in the world it deserves in comparison with other countries.' The value of 1 corresponds with strong agreement and therefore indicates a low perceived status. Accordingly, the value of 4 corresponds with a high perceived status.

The concept of '**international responsibility**' was assessed through the item 'My country should take more international responsibility and help other states, even if there are no direct benefits for my country.' The scale was inverted so that 1 corresponds with strong disagreement and therefore indicates a low potential to assume international responsibility; conversely, the value 4 corresponds with high potential. In the system of coordinates, the points are defined as the combination of the respective arithmetic means of the two items for each country.

Respondents in **Germany and France** perceive their countries as occupying a respectable position in the world. They also support a security and foreign policy that assumes responsibility and contributes to the international common good. Therefore, France and Germany have the public support to take a leading role in the development and enforcement of such policy.

In the 'Eastern European' countries of Poland, Latvia, Ukraine and Serbia, respondents also support their states' contribution to a security policy that fosters an international common good, but at the same time perceive the status of their countries as low. An inclusive security strategy can therefore build on public support in these countries. However, the widespread fear of losing status or remaining unimportant on the international stage must be taken into account.

The public of **Russia** shares with the Eastern European states the feeling of being left behind, but does not support the idea of contributing to an international common good. This is the main obstacle for developing and enforcing a successful security strategy. Inclusive European security would be barely possible without Russia, but Russian political elites currently do not have popular support for joining such an undertaking.

But there are a couple of challenges. One is the low level of trust in domestic institutions. An astonishing crisis of legitimacy can be seen in France and Germany towards national institutions such as political parties, government and the media. Such distrust goes across the board. The only two trustworthy institutions, in the opinion of the respondents, are the military and the police. A major challenge for a Franco-German initiative is the crumbling unity in the EU. The EU's disharmony is not helpful for a united foreign policy approach. Neither is the missing strategic discussion in Germany of taking on more responsibility in foreign affairs, which can be seen in the reluctance of the political elite. Whether a much-talked-about army of the EU could be a tool for European integration remains to be seen.

Another major challenge is Russia, because its leadership is not satisfied with the current security arrangements in Europe and is unwilling to give up influence in neighbouring countries or Crimea, knowing that its population supports it. Nine out of ten Russians believe that Crimea was legally incorporated by Russia. The threat Russia poses for other European countries is a major problem for cooperative security. As is the threat posed by the US, with its threats to multilateral security, according to opinion in several countries.

Nonetheless, there are still entry points for a French and German initiative. In January 2019, France and Germany signed a new bilateral friendship treaty, which provided for closer cooperation, including on foreign policy. Prior to that, President Macron repeatedly put forward proposals to strengthen European security. As our survey shows, these initiatives would have solid public backing. For example, most respondents believe that conflicts can be solved using peaceful means. This goes for the Ukrainian conflict as well – a diplomatic solution is favoured. In this respect at least, half of the people in all the countries surveyed think that there should be more cooperation between Russia and many European states. The majority of the respondents believe strongly that their respective country is part of the European cultural sphere.

France and Germany are both countries that have good enough relations with all parties to start rethinking security in Europe. For a broader approach, EU member states in Central Eastern Europe like Poland should be included, giving this initiative more legitimacy and responsibility and supplying the approach with more credibility for

a cooperative security architecture that is based on binding international norms and laws. Expert group discussions reveal, most notably in Poland but also in Latvia, that there is a considerable willingness on the side of the Central Eastern Europeans to join the 'German-French engine'. The next step would be to include non-EU members from the region.

III. Three Takeaways: Essential Steps for a Political Process

This examination of these three different perspectives and their potential consequences for a cooperative European security architecture leads us to three takeaways that need to be kept in mind for initiating a process towards a secure and stable Europe. They might not seem in line with the current Zeitgeist, but if any progress is to be achieved, these first steps will have to be taken. We believe that the opinion survey can be seen as a wake-up call for Europe before it is too late. If the INF treaty is discontinued, a rapid nuclear rearmament could follow. The people are ready and willing to cooperate; now it is up to the politicians to follow through.

Step 1: Taking security perceptions of others seriously

The fear of instability and military confrontation in the heart of Europe is tangible. Asking the experts in the seven countries one gets answers that reflect the feeling of an overarching uncertainty about their own societies and about their governments' foreign policy agendas.

One should avoid judging or even denying the fear of others. That means, that Russia has to take the threat perceptions of the Central Eastern European countries seriously – especially because these are grounded in a very long history, first of an expansive Russian empire and then a dominant Soviet Union. The Russian Federation has shown that using military force is still an option. It is not clear if Russia will do so again. But on the other side, Russia also deserves that its threat perceptions should also be seen as real, even though the biggest country in the world proclaims them.

Step 2: Looking for compromises

Cooperative European security architecture with every European state on board seems impossible in the current environment of big power rivalry. But things change. The oft-quoted 'end of history' lasted only a decade, if at all. If there is to be a common effort to improve the future state of affairs, compromises will be needed. It is easier to reconcile interests than perceptions: once we acknowledge and respect the differences, we can start negotiating a compromise. Since the survey shows that none of the populations of the seven states are belligerent, we argue that there is public support for dialogue and compromise.

After all, according to the Astana Declaration of 2010, as previously mentioned, the security of each member state in the OSCE region is tightly connected to that of all the other member states. Further NATO expansion should not be pursued, but at the same time sufficient security guarantees must be provided for countries like Ukraine. Moreover, a necessary step towards a stable European security architecture – one supported by both the populations surveyed and the experts involved – would be a diplomatic solution to the crisis in and around Ukraine.

There are still plenty of factors, mentioned above, which could potentially threaten any compromise in the near future. But the willingness of the majority to support cooperation over military conflict should be a serious stimulus for decision makers not to delay but rather to start a political process sooner rather than later. Germany and France could jointly kick-start it.

Step 3: Respecting international norms

So far, no government of any state participating in the survey has denounced the original Helsinki Accords of 1975 confirmed 35 years later by the OSCE in Astana. In general, international organisations such as the UN and the OSCE poll well among the populations of the seven countries. They represent international norms and cooperation. All populations acknowledge and support the interdependence of their own country with the well-being and positive development of other countries. This is a substantial argument in favour of international cooperation and dialogue. Together with an overwhelming majority committed to the relief of tensions in international politics

and the peaceful mitigation of conflicts, one can conclude that respect for international norms, in both small and large countries, is very much preferred by the population, as long as no country has special rights.

The practice of upholding international norms as well as restoring trust after breaches can be challenging, but the broad public support for norms is certainly helpful. A unilateral affirmation of already agreed-upon international norms as an important symbolic gesture in support of a rules-based order should be possible. New norms can be agreed upon on the basis of new compromises.

IV. Outlook

The results of the survey are twofold: On the one hand a partial backlash towards nationalism and militarisation is evident. Populism is clearly linked with European security. It seems that the mounting and simultaneously occurring challenges are bigger than the instruments at hand to possibly solve them. The crisis of liberal democracy, of trust in domestic state institutions, of multilateralism in international affairs, of transatlantic predictability and a digital revolution which is moving faster than one would hope for all contribute to the uncertainty.

On the other hand, a very clear longing for cooperation and peace in Europe is evident. This contrasts strongly with the situation before the First World War, which usually is used for comparison, when a major war seemed possible, plausible and geopolitically a win-win situation. It is now up to the Europe's population to spread the word voiced in our opinion poll, that 2019 is not 1914.



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